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In this paper, we re-examine the recent evidence that technology shocks do not produce business
cycle patterns in the data.  We first extend Gal￿￿s (1999) work, which uses long-run restrictions to identify
technology shocks, by examining whether the identified shocks can be plausibly interpreted as technology
shocks.  We do this in three ways.  First, we derive additional long-run restrictions and use them as tests
of overidentification.  Second, we compare the qualitative implications from the model with the impulse
responses of variables such as wages and consumption.  Third, we test whether some standard
￿exogenous￿ variables predict the shock variables.  We find that oil shocks, military build-ups, and
Romer dates do not predict the shock labeled ￿technology.￿  We then show ways in which a standard
DGE model can be modified to fit Gal￿￿s finding that a positive technology shock leads to lower labor
input.  Finally, we re-examine the properties of the other key shock to the system.
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I.  Introduction 
  Real business cycle theory assigns a central role to technology shocks as the source of 
aggregate fluctuations.  As King and Rebelo (1999) discuss in ￿Resuscitating Real Business 
Cycles,￿ when persistent technology shocks are fed through a standard real business cycle 
model, the simulated economy displays patterns similar to those exhibited by actual business 
cycles.  While the last decade has seen the addition of other types of shocks in these models, 
such as monetary policy and government spending, none has been shown to be a central impulse 
to business cycles. 
  A trio of recent papers has called into question the notion that technology shocks have 
anything to do with business cycles.  Although they use very different methods, Gal￿ (1999), 
Shea (1998) and Basu, Kimball, and Fernald (1999) all present the same result: positive 
technology shocks appear to lead to declines in labor input.
1 Gal￿ identifies technology shocks 
using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR; Shea uses data on patents and R&D; and Basu, 
Kimball and Fernald identify technology shocks by estimating Hall-style regressions with 
proxies for utilization.  In all cases, they find significant negative correlations of hours with the 
technology shock.
2 
  Gal￿￿s paper also studies the effects of the non-technology shocks, which he suggests 
might be interpreted as demand shocks.  These shocks produce the typical business cycle 
                                                           
1 The fall in labor input is a long run response in Shea.  Labor rises in the short run and then eventually falls. 
 
2 Shapiro and Watson (1988) uncovered this result a decade ago, but it apparently went unnoticed.  (See Figures 2 
and 5 of their paper.) 
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comovement between output and hours.  In response to a positive shock, both output and hours 
show a rise in the typical hump-shaped pattern.  Productivity also rises, but only temporarily. 
  We view the empirical results of these papers to be potential paradigm shifters.  If these 
results prove to be robust, the idea of technology-driven business cycles loses all of its appeal.  If 
it is ￿demand￿ shocks that are producing the classic business cycle patterns, then renewed 
emphasis should be devoted to understanding the imperfections in the economy that allow these 
shocks to have these types of effects. 
  In this paper, we re-examine the effects of shocks identified using long-run restrictions. 
First, we impose two additional long-run restrictions, allowing us to test formally the over-
identifying restrictions.  Second, we provide evidence on the plausibility of Gal￿￿s identification 
scheme by studying the effects of identified technology shocks on other economic variables. We 
also analyze whether the qualitative effects of the shocks on other variables are economically 
plausible by comparing the effects to those predicted by a standard growth model. 
We then study whether suitably altered dynamic general equilibrium models can explain 
the facts.  We present examples of two models that can explain these effects of technology 
shocks, without resorting to assumptions about sticky prices.  One model assumes Leontief 
technology with variable utilization and the other model includes habit formation in consumption 
and adjustment costs in investment.  Despite their ability to explain these effects, the modified 
models do not resuscitate technology shocks as the driving force of business cycles.  In that 
sense, the original technology-driven real business cycle hypothesis does appear to be dead. 
In the last part of the paper we study the broader implications of Gal￿￿s ￿demand shocks,￿  
which are identified as the shocks to labor that are uncorrelated with the technology shock.   
According to Gal￿￿s work, these shocks are the ones that produce the standard business cycle  3
comovements and match well with NBER business cycles.  We examine the effects of these 
shocks on our broader list of variables, as well as their correlation with key exogenous variables. 
 
II.  Effects of a Technology Shock in a Standard DGE Model 
To assess the plausibility of the interpretation of the shocks, we begin by highlighting the 
predictions about how permanent technology shocks should affect other key variables in the 
economy of a standard DGE (dynamic general equilibrium) model.  We employ a model that is a 
simple extension of the model presented in the working paper version of King, Plosser, Stock 
and Watson (1987).  This model produces two additional long-run restrictions, as well as 
qualitative predictions for several other variables. 
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The variables have the standard definitions: Y is output, A is an exogenous process for total 
factor productivity, K is capital, N is labor input, δ is the depreciation rate, I is investment, and C 
is consumption.  We assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, and 
that v(N) is decreasing and quasi-convex in N.  The representative consumer maximizes the 
expected present discounted value of utility, with discount factor β.   4
A key assumption in the Gal￿ analysis is that the technology shock has a unit root.  We 
capture this feature in the model with the assumption: 
 
(2)  1 ln( ) ln( ) tt t AA µ η − =+ +, 
 
where η is a stationary shock.  η corresponds to the shock that the structural VAR seeks to 
uncover. 
  As discussed by King et al, since the economy has a stochastic steady state, one needs to 
transform the model so that it has a stationary distribution.  In this case, we divide Kt, It, and Ct 
by  At
1/α  and modify the problem accordingly.  Denoting the decision rules governing the 
transformed (stationary) capital, investment and consumption variables by lower case letters, it is 
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All of the terms involving functions of kt = Kt/At
1/α are, by construction, stationary.  In this simple 
model,  ln At  is the only source of stochastic trend, and it is common to all variables, except for 
labor input. 
Inspection of the equations reveals that a positive shock η to the ln At equation should 
lead to permanent increases in labor productivity, output, consumption, investment, real wages, 
and capital.  In contrast, such a shock has no long-run effect on hours because the specification 
of preferences forces the wealth and substitution effects on labor supply to cancel exactly. 
To determine the features that distinguish technology shocks from other shocks, let us 
compare these effects to those from other possible sources of permanent shocks or stochastic 
trends in these kinds of model.  Two leading candidates that have been studied in the literature 
are permanent changes in government purchases and shifts in preferences (e.g. Baxter and King 
(1991, 1993), Ahmed and Yoo (1995)).  Both of these shocks work by shifting labor supply, and 
they are predicted to have permanent effects on output, consumption, investment and capital.  In 
contrast, they should have only temporary effects on labor productivity or real wages: If labor 
supply rises, firms accumulate capital until labor productivity and real wages return to their 
previous values.  Thus, one of the distinguishing features of a technology shock is its permanent 
effect on labor productivity and real wages. 
A third type of shock is a monetary shock.  In most models, a monetary shock has a 
permanent effect only on the price level.  Its effect on real variables such as output and 
productivity is fleeting. 
Gal￿ uses the insight that only technology shocks should have a permanent effect on 
productivity to identify technology shocks in the data.  Our discussion of the model reveals two 
more long-run restrictions implied by standard theory.  First, analogous to the prediction for  6
labor productivity, only technology shocks can have a permanent effect on wages.  Second, 
while permanent government spending shocks and preference shifts will have a permanent effect 
on hours per capita, technology shocks should have only a temporary effect on hours. All real 
business cycle models, including the one above, specify a utility function in which the income 
and substitution effects of an increase in the real wage exactly cancel.  This feature is necessary 
to match the growth facts: over the last century there has been a significant increase in the real 
wage accompanied by virtually no change in hours per capita.   Thus, a complementary long-run 
restriction for identifying a technology shock is that the technology shock should have no long-
run effect on hours.  
There are no analogous long-run restrictions with respect to the other variables.  All three 
kinds of shocks can have permanent effects on output, consumption, and investment.  We can, 
however, check whether the response of these variables to an identified technology shock is 
qualitatively in line with the model￿s predictions. 
Various permutations of these long-run restrictions appear in the literature.  Most papers 
discuss long-run restrictions derived in the context of the traditional aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply framework.  Table 1 shows the long-run restrictions imposed by various 
researchers.  Many previous papers have assumed that aggregate demand shocks cannot effect 
hours in the long-run.  While monetary shocks satisfy this assumption in most models, fiscal 
shocks do not since they can have long-run effects on both output and hours in the neoclassical 
model.  Thus, it is unclear how to interpret the aggregate demand shocks identified in these 
models or how fiscal shocks would be classified. 
The paper that imposes the widest range of available long-run restrictions is Fleischman￿s 
(2000) study of the cyclicality of the real wage.  As indicated in Table 1, Fleischman uses both  7
the Shapiro-Watson restriction that technology shocks and AD shocks cannot affect hours in the 
long-run, as well as Gal￿￿s restriction that only technology shocks have a long-run effect on 
productivity.  Fleischman also imposes the long-run restrictions that only oil price shocks and 
technology shocks have permanent effects on real wages. 
Our analysis differs from Fleischman￿s in four ways.  First, we do not impose the AD 
restrictions derived from traditional Keynesian models, since we find them hard to interpret.  
Second, we do not include oil prices directly in the model, although we study their correlations 
with the identified shocks.  Third, we show that some of the results are sensitive to the type of 
cointegrating vector used in the analysis.   Fourth, and most importantly, we study the response 
of variables such as hours, consumption, and investment, as well as the correlation between real 
wages and output that is the focus of Fleischman￿s analysis. 
  In the next section, we investigate how the results vary when we use different long-run 
identification schemes.  We then impose all of the available long-run restrictions and formally 
use them as tests of overidentifying restrictions.  Finally, we investigate whether the other 
variables react to the identified shock in the way predicted by the model. 
 
III.  Empirical Framework and Results 
A. Econometric  Framework 
We begin by reviewing Gal￿￿s baseline model, and then extend it to incorporate more 
restrictions and more variables.  In this model, the technology shock is identified as the only 
shock that can have permanent effects on productivity.  This assumption is relatively 
unrestrictive as it allows for temporary effects of non-technology shocks on measured  8
productivity, through variations in capital utilization and effort.  Gal￿￿s basic framework consists 
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xt  denotes the log of labor productivity, nt denotes the log of labor input, ε
z denotes the 
technology shock, and ε
m denotes the non-technology shock.  C(L) is a polynomial in the lag 
operator.  We invoke the usual assumption that ε
z and ε
m are orthogonal.  The assumption 
identifying the technology shock implies that C
12(1) = 0, which restricts the unit root in 
productivity to originate solely in the technology shock.  Implicit in this specification, but not 
necessary for identification, is the assumption that the log of labor input has a unit root. 
Another way to think about this restriction is through the estimation method suggested by 
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As discussed by Shapiro and Watson (1988), imposing the long-run restriction is equivalent to 
restricting the other variables to enter the equation in double-differences.  Because the current 
value of 
2
t n ∆ will be correlated with
z
t ε in the first equation, one must use instrumental variables  9
to estimate the equation.  Using lags one through p of  t x ∆  and t n ∆ as instruments yields estimates 
that are identical to those obtained using matrix methods. 
The second shock to the system, 
m
t ε , is identified by including the estimated residual 
from the first equation in the second equation, along with the standard lags of the variables, as 
shown in equation (5b).  The estimated residual from this equation, 
m
t ε , is identified as the 
￿nontechnology￿ or ￿demand￿ shock. 
  Consider now the alternative long-run restriction involving real wages.  Analogous to the 
case of labor productivity, only a technology shock should have a permanent effect on real 
wages.  Thus, an alternative way to identify the technology shock is to substitute real wages for 
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But we can go even farther by considering the third long-run restriction that technology 
shocks have no long-run effect on hours.  We can thus create a shock that excludes permanent 
technology shocks.  We impose this restriction by constraining C
21(1) = 0 in equation (4) above.  
To impose this restriction in the IV (instrumental variable) framework, we estimate the hours  10
equation with double differences of productivity, and insert the identified shock in the 
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Note that Equation (7b) must be estimated before equation (7a) to create the error term as a 
regressor.  The residual in equation (7b) should be orthogonal to the technology shock since the 
former can have a long-run effect on hours.  Note, though, that in contrast to the previous 
systems, the residual in the productivity equation, 
z
t ε
′′ , may include other shocks in addition to 
the technology shock.  For example, a monetary shock that has no long-run effect on hours 
would be included in 
z
t ε
′′ and not in 
m
t ε
′′ .  There is not a perfect correspondence between the 
shocks in system (7a) and (7b) and those from the previous systems. 
  The first set of empirical results will be based on these bivariate models.  Later, we will 
also analyze models with more variables.  We reserve the discussion of the larger models for the 
sections that do those analyses. 
 
B. Data 
We use quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2000:4 to estimate the model.  For the series on 
labor productivity and labor input, we use the BLS series ￿Index of output per hour, business￿ 
and ￿Index of hours in business,￿ respectively.  These series are somewhat different from those  11
used by Gal￿, who used total employee hours in nonagricultural establishments for labor input 
and GDP divided by this labor input measure for productivity.  His labor input measure includes 
only private employee hours, but his GDP measure includes government.  Thus, a shift toward 
more government output would appear to raise productivity because it would raise the numerator 
and lower the denominator in the productivity measure.  We believe our measures to be more 
accurate, although as we show below, we obtain the same basic results as Gal￿.  The real wage 
measure is the BLS measure of nominal hourly compensation in private business divided by the 
BLS deflator for private business.  The other series are chain-weighted 1996 dollar NIPA series 
from the BEA Web site.  All relevant variables are put on a per capita basis by dividing by the 
population age 16 and above.  
In the baseline specification of the model, we assume that all variables have unit roots, an 
assumption not rejected by the data.  We include four quarterly lags of each variable in the 
estimation, based on a BIC criterion. 
Before turning to the estimation of the models, it is useful to remember the types of 
unconditional correlations displayed by the post-WWII data.  These correlations constitute some 
of the key stylized facts of business cycle analysis.  In growth rates, the correlation between the 
output and hours is 0.67; between output and productivity, 0.70; and between productivity and 
hours,  ￿0.046.  The correlation is 0.50 between real wages and productivity, and ￿0.23 between 
real wages and hours (all in growth rates).   12
 
C.  Comparison of Different Identification Schemes 
The first step is to determine how the effects of a technology shock differ across the three 
long-run identification schemes.  To this end, we estimate models (5) - (7) separately and 
calculate the impulse responses. 
Figures 1A-1C show the effects of the identified technology shocks on productivity (or 
wages in system (6)) and hours.
3  Figure 1A shows the impulse responses using Gal￿￿s 
identification scheme.  Despite the changes in variables and the longer sample period, the results 
are very similar to his results.  An identified technology shock leads to an immediate and 
permanent rise in productivity.  In response to the same shock, hours worked declines and does 
not return to near normal for a year and a half.  
Consider Figure 1B, which shows the effect of a technology shock identified as the only 
shock that permanently affects real wages.  These results are consistent with the previous results: 
a technology shock leads to an immediate and permanent rise in real wages and a decline in 
hours.  In this graph, hours show no tendency to return to their former levels.  
Finally, Figure 1C shows the effect of a shock that does not have a permanent effect on 
hours.  Recall that a technology shock would meet this criterion, but so also would a monetary 
shock.  Thus, this shock is potentially a mixture of various types of shocks.  Given this caveat, 
the results are surprisingly similar to the previous ones: productivity jumps immediately and 
permanently and hours fall in the short-run. Hours do show a quicker tendency to return to 
normal, taking about a year. 
                                                           
3 The standard error bands were computed using a bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure with 1000 replications. 
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Given our initial skepticism concerning long-run restrictions, we were surprised to find 
that technology shocks identified with three different long-run identification schemes produced 
reactions of hours and productivity (or wages) that were similar across the systems.  In all three 
schemes, a positive technology shock appears to lead to a decline in hours for at least a year. 
The next step is to specify a unified model in which the additional restrictions can be 
used as overidentification tests.  The tests are a bit tricky because the two additional restrictions 
are incorporated in different ways.  The first restriction on wages, in conjunction with Gal￿￿s 
restriction on labor productivity, implies that productivity and real wages should share a common 
stochastic trend, which is identified as the technology shock.  In other words, labor productivity 
and real wages should be cointegrated (Engle and Granger (1987), Stock and Watson (1988)).  
Thus, the test of the joint restriction that technology shocks are the only shocks that have 
permanent effects on both productivity and real wages is a test of cointegration between the two 
variables. 
The first row of Table 2 tests for a unit root in (the negative of) labor share, x ￿ w.  As 
shown in equation (3) of the theoretical model, theory predicts that not only should labor 
productivity and wages be cointegrated, but also that the cointegrating vector should be (1,-1).  
In other words, the labor share should be stationary.  As the table shows, the test supports the 
notion that labor share is indeed stationary; the p-value of the test of a unit root is 0.02. 
The second row of Table 2 tests directly for cointegration between productivity and 
wages and estimates the cointegrating vector.  The results support the hypothesis that the two 
variables are cointegrated and that the cointegrating vector is (1, -1.03649).  The standard errors 
suggest that this vector is significantly different from (1,-1).
4   As we shall show, the seemingly 
                                                           
4 The coefficients are estimated using Dynamic OLS with optimal lead and lag selection.  The standard errors are 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on a Bartlett kernel with 8 lags.  14
small switch from ￿1 to ￿1.036 in the construction of the error correction term has a noticeable 
effect on its explanatory power, as well as some of the impulse response functions. 
In sum, the evidence in favor of cointegration can be interpreted as evidence in favor of 
the joint restrictions on the effect of technology on productivity and wages.  Wages and 
productivity share a common stochastic trend.  Technological progress is a natural interpretation 
of that trend. 
To test the third restriction concerning hours, we specify a trivariate vector error-
correction model (VECM) which incorporates the other two restrictions.  This model takes the 
form: 
 
(8a) ( ) tt yC L u = , 
 
where yt  is a 3 x 1 vector consisting of labor productivity growth (∆xt), hours growth (∆nt), and 
the error correction term between productivity and wages (xt ￿ β wt).  ut consists of the shocks 
,,
z mw
tt t ε εε , in that order. 
To estimate the system properly, we should include p lags of labor productivity growth 
and real wage growth, plus one lag of the error correction term, or equivalently, p lags of labor 
productivity growth and p+1 lags of the error correction term.  We use the latter representation.
5 
The long-run restrictions are imposed by constraining the matrix of long-run multipliers, 
C(1), as follows: 
 
                                                           
















The combination of setting the c1j = 0 for j = 2, 3 and estimating the system in error correction 
form has the effect of imposing the two long-run constraints with respect to productivity and 
wages.  Conditional on the assumption of cointegration, the overidentifying test for the third 
restriction is the test that the shock that has a long-run effect on hours is uncorrelated with the 
technology shock. 
In practice, the test must be performed in two steps.  The first step estimates the 
permanent hours shock directly from the bivariate model in equation (7b).  The second step uses 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate system (8).  The separately estimated 
nontechnology shock is used as an additional instrument in the productivity equation, since it 
should be uncorrelated with the technology shock. 
The test of overidentifying restrictions is based on Hansen￿s J-statistic with one degree of 
freedom.  For the estimated model in (8), Hansen￿s J-statistic is 0.117, with a p-value of 0.73.  
There is no evidence against the overidentifying restriction with respect to hours.  The formal 
test supports the results given in the impulse response functions from the bivariate model: all 
three identification schemes are mutually consistent. 
 
D.  Exogeneity of Identified Technology Shocks 
As argued by Hall (1988) and Evans (1992), the technology shock should not in principle 
be correlated with other exogenous shocks that are not related to technology.  Evans cast doubt 
on the use of the Solow residual as a measure of technology shocks by showing that money,  16
interest rates and government spending Granger-cause the Solow residual.  Thus, an additional 
means to test whether the identified shocks are really technology shocks is to test whether other 
exogenous variables (which should not be related to technology) are correlated with the shocks. 
We consider three sets of dummy variables for shocks that have been used in the 
literature:  Romer and Romer￿s (1989) monetary indicators, Hoover and Perez￿s (1994) oil shock 
dummies, and Ramey and Shapiro￿s (1998) war dates.  Strong cases have been made for the 
exogeneity of the oil shocks and the war dates, but the exogeneity of the monetary indicators is 
more controversial.  All three of these variables, though, have been shown to have significant 
effects on GDP.
6 
Table 3 shows test statistics based on regressions of the identified technology shock 
(estimated from equation (5a) on each of the three sets of dummy variables.   In each case, we 
regress the technology shock on the current value as well as four lags of the dummy variable.  
We do not include lags of the technology shock in the regression since it is by construction not 
serially correlated.   
As is evident from the p-values on the F-tests, none of the sets of dummy variables is 
significant in explaining the technology shock.  The lowest p-value is for Ramey-Shapiro war 
dates, but even then the p-value is 0.12.  Hence, there is no evidence that the technology shock 
identified using long-run restrictions is correlated with any of these other three shocks.
7 
The identified technology shock thus passes the Evans￿ test.  This result provides further 
support for the plausibility of the shock as a technology shock.  The technology shock identified 
                                                           
6 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) for a comparison of the explanatory power of these variables for GDP. 
 
7 Hamilton￿s (1996) net oil increase variable does no better than Hoover-Perez￿s oil dummy variable in explaining 
the technology shock.   17
with these long-run restrictions appears to be a better candidate than the Solow residual for a true 
technology shock. 
 
E.  Evidence from a 5 -Variable Model 
We now study the qualitative effects of these shocks on the wider set of variables 
discussed in the context of the model.  The variables consist of labor productivity, hours, real 
wages, investment and consumption.   
We first conducted an analysis to determine whether there were any other cointegrating 
relationships in addition to the one between productivity and wages.  We studied many possible 
combinations of the five variables, and determined that the best description of the system was 
one with two cointegrating vectors and three stochastic trends.  The results of the key 
cointegration tests supporting this conclusion are shown in rows (3) and (4) of Table 2.  As row 
(3) shows, there is strong evidence of a cointegrating relationship between hours, real wages, and 
consumption. We could find no evidence of cointegration between other variables. 
The Johansen test also supports the hypothesis that there are three stochastic trends and 
two cointegrating vectors in this five variable system.  As shown in row 4 of Table 2, one can 
reject the hypotheses that there are one or fewer cointegrating vectors, but not the hypothesis that 
there are less than or equal to two cointegrating vectors. 
We therefore specify the five-variable model as follows: 
 




12 22 23 24 25
31 32 33 34 35
41 42 43 44 45

















yt in equation (9a)  is a 5 x 1 vector consisting of the labor productivity growth (∆xt), hours 
growth (∆nt), the error correction term between productivity and wages (xwt), investment growth 
(∆it), and an error correction term involving consumption, hours, and wages (nwct).  ut consists 
of the shocks  , , , ,
z mwic
tt tt t ε εεε ε , in that order.  As a robustness check, we also show results from a 
system without any allowance for cointegration.  In the alternative system, we use only the 
growth rates of productivity, hours, real wages, investment and consumption. 
The zero restrictions in the first row of the matrix of long-run multipliers are the natural 
extension of Gal￿￿s restrictions to the larger model.  We do not impose the additional restriction 
with respect to the long-run effect of productivity on hours; the results are similar in either case. 
Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C show the effect of the identified technology shock on the logs of 
productivity, labor input, private output, real product wage, investment, and consumption.  (The 
log of output is simply the sum of the log of productivity and the log of labor input.)  Figure 2A 
is produced from the VECM with the two estimated cointegrating terms shown in Table 2.  We 
call this specification the ￿baseline VECM.￿  Figure 2B is produced from the VECM in which 
we impose the theoretical cointegrating vector of productivity and wages of (1,-1).
8   We refer to 
this specification as the ￿labor share VECM.￿ Figure 2C is produced from the system estimated 
in first-differences. 
                                                           
8 We continue to use the estimated cointegrating vector for the hours, wages and consumption.  19
The results are mostly similar across the three specifications.  Consistent with the 
bivariate results, the shock raises productivity and real wages permanently, and lowers hours in 
the short-run.  In the baseline VECM, the real wage response lags the productivity response.  In 
the labor share VECM and the first-difference specification, real wages and productivity both 
jump immediately and follow very similar paths.  In all specifications, output rises, but by less 
than productivity in the short-run.  The decline in labor is not enough to offset the rise in 
productivity. 
  The investment graphs shows the impact of a positive identified technology shock on 
investment, defined as gross private investment, which includes nonresidential, residential and 
inventory investment.  Investment rises during the first year after the shock, with the rise being 
stronger in the baseline VECM in Figure 2A.  This response is qualitatively in line with the 
theoretical model.  The positive technology shock raises the productivity of capital, inducing 
firms to raise the level of their capital stock.  The sluggishness of the short-run response seems to 
suggest some type of adjustment cost. 
A permanent positive technology shock raises wealth and thus should raise consumption 
in the long-run.  Basu, Kimball, and Fernald show that their estimate of the technology shock 
leads to no change in consumption on impact, and then a slow rise.  Here we find that 
consumption jumps a small amount initially and then rises to a permanently higher level.  This 
response is consistent with a permanent technology shock.  The slow adjustment of consumption 
suggests some kind of adjustment cost and/or high real interest rates. 
 
  To summarize, all of the results shown in this section serve to support the plausibility of 
interpreting the shock as a technology shock.   The use of alternative long-run restrictions for  20
identifying the technology shock leads to qualitatively similar results.  The shocks appear to be 
uncorrelated with other key exogenous variables.  Furthermore, the effect of the technology 
shock on key variables such as wages, consumption and investment is in line with those that we 
would expect.  The only result at odds with the standard RBC model is the negative effect of the 
shock on labor input.  The next section will examine whether the standard model can be 
modified to produce these results. 
 
IV.  Two DGE Models with Negative Technology-Hours Correlations 
Gal￿ (1999) and Basu, Kimball and Fernald (1999) suggest that the negative correlation 
between the technology shock and labor input is evidence in favor of a sticky-price model.  In a 
sticky-price model, a positive technology shock can lead to a decline in labor input if the 
monetary authority is not too accomodative.  Stickiness of prices implies that aggregate demand 
cannot change immediately.  Since demand does not increase, firms can meet demand with fewer 
workers since their productivity has increased.  
But sticky-price models are not the only types of models that can produce the negative 
correlation.  In this section, we offer two examples of DGE models with flexible prices that also 
imply a negative correlation between technology shocks and labor input.  The first model uses 
habit formation in consumption combined with adjustment costs in investment.  The second 
model changes the production technology so that it is closer to Leontief in the short-run.  It is 
interesting to note that the first of these models had been previously dismissed in the literature 
because the implied negative correlation between technology and labor was ￿counterfactual.￿   
The previous empirical results suggest that the model￿s predictions are completely in line with 
the ￿facts.￿  21
 
A.  Model 1:  Habit Formation in Consumption and Adjustment Costs on Investment 
Previous work by Jermann (1998) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) has used 
models with habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment to study asset 
pricing in production economies.  Jermann incorporates habit formation in preferences and 
capital adjustment costs in order to explain the equity premium and the average risk-free rate 
observed in the data.  His model assumes no utility from leisure, so employment does not 
fluctuate.  Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher and Lettau and Uhlig (2000) criticize Jerman￿s model 
because once employment is allowed to fluctuate, it produces a persistently negative response of 
hours worked to a positive technology shock, which they argue is counterfactual.  In light of the 
previous empirical results, this implication is not counterfactual.  We will now explore how the 
combination of habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs in investment produces 
responses that are consistent with the empirical impulse response functions. 
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In the first equation, Ct denotes consumption in period t, Nt denotes hours worked, and the E 
denotes conditional expectations.  The term bCt  is the household￿s habit stock.  In our 
specification, setting b = 0 recovers the standard type of preferences. 
  The economy￿s technology and resource constraints are given by the standard equations: 
where Yt denotes output, At denotes technology, Kt is the capital at the beginning of period t, and 
It is investment.  In the capital accumulation equation the function φ, which is positive and 
concave in the investment-capital ratio, captures the capital adjustment costs.  If θ = 0, then this 
part of the model collapses to the standard equation of motion for capital.  If θ is positive, then 
there are adjustment costs to changing the capital stock too rapidly.  In this case, Tobin￿s q can 
deviate from unity.   
  In sum, this model deviates from the standard DGE model in two ways:  habit formation 
in preferences and adjustment costs on capital.  Otherwise, the model is very standard. 
We calibrate the model along the lines of Boldrin et al. (2001), who were trying to match 




Parameter Value    Parameter  Value 
β   0.99   b  0.9 
δ   0.021   θ  4.348 
α   0.64      
 
We set a1 and a2 so that the balanced growth path is invariant to the value of θ.  In particular, we 
set  1 a








  The parameters in the first column represent standard parameterizations of an RBC 
model.  The parameters in the second column represent parameters special to the modifications 
we made.  Following Jermann and Boldrin et al, we set the habit persistence parameter very high 
at 0.9 and the adjustment cost parameter very high, at over 4.
9 
  In order to compare the predictions of the model to the results from the data, we 
investigate the effect of a permanent, unanticipated jump in the technology variable A.  We 
compare the responses of key variables to this shock in our model to those from a standard RBC 
model with b = 0 and θ = 0. 
Figure 3 shows the paths of the technology variable, output, hours, the real wage, 
consumption, and investment. All variables shown are in logarithms and are normalized to be 
zero in the pre-shock period.  Consider first the responses of output and investment.  As the 
graphs make clear, the modified model produces slower responses of these variables relative to 
the standard model.  In the modified model, consumption does not jump up at all, but increases 
only gradually.  Thus, output, investment and consumption all respond more sluggishly than in 
the standard model. 
In contrast, hours and wages respond more dramatically, and in different ways, in the 
modified model.  In the standard model, hours rise temporarily in response to a positive 
technology shock.  This rise in hours occurs because the substitution effect due to higher wages 
and real interest rates outweighs the wealth effect in short-run.  (In the long-run, they exactly 
offset each other so the level of hours returns to its previous value.)   The opposite is true in the 
modified model.  The level of hours falls temporarily in response to a positive technology shock. 
                                                           
9 Actually, both Jermann and Boldrin et al refer to an adjustment cost parameter ξ, which is equal to the inverse of 
our θ.  They set ξ equal to 0.23, so we set θ= 1/0.23.  24
Thus, in the modified model consumption and hours move in the opposite direction.  In both 
cases, the real wage rises, but it rises more in the short-run in the modified model.   
  The modified model produces responses that are broadly consistent with the empirical 
results shown in the last section.  In particular, both show a gradual, but permanent, rise in 
output, investment and consumption.  Both show an immediate rise in productivity and real 
wages.  Finally, both show a drop in hours worked in response to a positive technology shock.
10  
Why is the response of hours worked so different from the response in a standard RBC 
model?  In the standard model, the wealth effect has an immediate impact on consumption; the 
only reason consumption does not immediately jump to its new steady-state level is that real 
interest rates are temporarily high.  In the modified model, habit persistence induces a 
sluggishness in the response of consumption.  Consumers prefer not to change their consumption 
by too much.  The natural alternative would be to put the extra resources into investment.   
However, the high adjustment cost on investment makes investment a relatively expensive good 
in the short-run.  Thus, the households ￿spend￿ the new wealth on the only remaining alternative: 
leisure.  Leisure has also become more expensive (because of the increased real wage), but with 
our calibration it is less expensive than investment. 
To illustrate how important each modification is to obtaining the results, Figure 4 shows 
the simulation results from three models:  (1) Our modified model (b = 0.9 and θ = 4.348); (2) A 
model with just habit persistence (b = 0.9 and θ = 0); and (3) A model with just adjustment costs 
on investment (b = 0 and θ = 4.348).  Comparing results of the three models gives us a feel as to 
how the negative impact of a technology shock is generated. 
                                                           
10 The graphs show the responses out to 20 quarters.  Not shown in the graphs is the fact that the labor supply 
rebounds in the intermediate-run, so that labor supply rises temporarily above the long-run level.   25
The graph makes clear that it is the combined sluggishness in investment (due to 
investment adjustment costs ) and consumption (due to habit persistence) that drives the decline 
in labor.  Without both effects, labor either rises or declines very little. The differences in the 
paths of real wages are caused by the differential labor supply response.  Not surprisingly, real 
wages rise the most when labor supply falls the most.  
The high values of b and θ are not necessary to generate the negative response of labor.  
For example, a model with b = 0.5 and θ = 2 generates a fall in hours for almost two years.  The 
drop in hours on impact is 2.5 percent for a five percent positive technology shock.  
Therefore, a model with habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in 
investment can match the effects of a technology shock in the data. In particular, the model can 
explain the empirically observed drop in labor input after a technology shock.  It does so with 
types of frictions that are fairly well supported in the literature, i.e. adjustment costs on 
investment and habit persistence in consumption.  
Before turning to a model that features a modification to the production technology, it is 
important to note that there are other modifications to preferences that can lead to a negative 
correlation between technology and hours.  For example, Campbell and Ludvigson (2001) 
present a model with home production that allows a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption to be consistent with balanced growth. This low intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution combined with a highly persistent technology shock produces a negative correlation 
between technology and hours worked.  Campbell and Ludvigson state that this prediction is a 
fundamental difficulty of the model.  Once again, in light of the empirical results it should be 
considered a strength of the model. 
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B.  Model 2:  A Leontief Model with Labor-Saving Technology Shocks  
In this section, we explore the effects of labor-saving technology shocks when the short-
run production function features fixed proportions.  Although the negative relationship between 
hours and technology is easily reproduced in a simple model, we explore a slightly more general 
version because of its improved predictions for wages.  In particular, we use a one-sector version 
of the variable-utilization model employed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to study the effects of 
military buildups. 
The model takes the following form: 
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The specification of technology implies that at any instant in time, workers (N) and machines (K) 
must be combined in fixed proportions; for example, one worker is combined with one machine.  
Thus, firms can increase output within the period only by increasing the workweek of capital.  
The workweek of capital is given by (1 + S), where the standard 40 hour workweek has been 
normalized to unity, so that S is the proportion relative to the standard week.  
The preferences we specify are standard, except for the addition of a term that involves 
hours beyond the standard workweek.  In this specification, hours worked outside the standard  27
daytime hours generate disutility. In addition to the standard effects of a decline in leisure, 
nonstandard hours generate increasing marginal disutility.  Ramey and Shapiro (1998) discuss 
the empirical justification for these preferences. 
We choose values of the parameters to match capital-output ratios and estimated overtime 
premia.  In the production function, we set initial values so αn = αk = 8.  In the preference 
specification, we set θ = 0.05 and T = 50.  The quarterly discount factor β is set equal to 0.99 and 
the depreciation rate to 0.021. These values generate an overtime premium of 33 percent and a 
value of S equal to 0.172 in the steady-state. Using this model, we explore the effect of an 
unanticipated permanent five percent decline in the value of αn from 8 to 7.6.  The decline in αn 
implies that fewer workers are needed to operate each machine. 
  Figure 5 shows the results of the simulations.  All variables shown are in logarithms and 
are normalized to be zero in the pre-shock period.  The path of technology shows the path of 
1/αn. 
  Output shows a small amount of sluggishness relative to the RBC model, whereas 
consumption shows substantial sluggishness.  In fact, consumption dips slightly on impact.  The 
source of the slow rise of consumption is the high real interest rate.  The shock to labor saving 
technology raises the marginal product of capital, leading to higher desired investment.  The 
limited opportunities to extend the workweek of capital dampen the output response, so 
consumption must rise by less than it would in the standard model.  
The behavior of hours is the key result.  Total hours fall in response to the labor-saving 
technology shock.  To save space, we did not plot the components of hours: the number of 
workers versus hours per worker.  We find that the number of workers falls in response to the  28
shock whereas hours per worker rises, through shift or overtime hours.  For the given calibration, 
the first effect dominates the second effect so that total hours falls. 
How can real wages rise in the face of declining hours?  The reason for the rise in wages 
in the face of declining hours is the increased use of shifts or overtime in order to extend the 
workweek of capital.  Because shift or overtime work demands a premium (owing to the nature 
of the utility function), average wages per hour worked rises even though total hours worked 
falls.  In the simple Leontief model with no shifts, real wages and consumption fall. 
 
To summarize, the models we have presented in this section demonstrate that 
modifications to either preferences or the substitution possibilities between capital and labor can 
produce a negative correlation between hours and technology.  None of these models require 
sticky prices or wages to produce the results. 
 
D.  Sticky Price Explanations versus Adjustment Cost and Habit Persistence Explanations 
  As mentioned earlier, Gal￿ (1999) and Basu, Kimball and Fernald (1999) suggest that the 
negative correlation between the technology shock and labor input is evidence in favor of a 
sticky-price model. Gal￿ (1999) presents a stylized static model of sticky prices to illustrate how 
that class of models can produce a negative correlation between technology shocks and labor 
input.  In his version, in the face of a positive productivity shock but unchanged aggregate 
demand, firms need fewer workers to produce the same amount of output.  Thus, labor demand 
falls. 
The results also hold up in some more complete dynamic models with sticky prices, but 
the mechanism changes somewhat.  King and Wolman (1996) and Dotsey (1999) also obtain a  29
negative effect of technology shocks on labor in the short-run in certain models.  King and 
Wolman use Calvo-type (1983) random price adjustment, whereas Dotsey uses staggered price 
contracts.  Both papers show that if the monetary authority targets the money supply, a positive 
technology shock causes labor input to drop. After a positive productivity shock, firms￿ markups 
rise, so there is a greater wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and the real wage.  
Because the wedge is expected to decrease over time, real wages are expected to rise in the 
future, so individuals reduce their labor supply in the short-run due to the intertemporal 
substitution effect.
11 
Both of our models and the dynamic sticky price model predict a fall in hours in the 
short-run.  The mechanism by which this effect occurs is very different, though.  In the dynamic 
sticky price model, hours fall because current wages are low relative to expected future wages.  
In the habit formation￿adjustment cost model, hours fall because leisure is the only variable that 
can respond significantly to the wealth effect of the technology shock in the short-run.  In the 
Leontief model, hours also fall because current wages are low relative to expected future wages.   
In the habit formation-adjustment cost model, real wages jump so far on impact that they 
actually overshoot their long-run level slightly.   In contrast, in the sticky price model (shown in 
King and Wolman￿s Figure 6F) real wages do not adjust at all on impact, and then rise steeply 
during the ten quarters when labor input is below normal. There is a similar pattern in the 
Leontief model.  It is the steep rise of wages that is the key to the reduction in labor supply.  
Thus, the three types of models differ in their predictions for the path of wages.   
Unfortunately, the empirical results are not precise enough to allow us to distinguish between the 
                                                           
11 It is important to note, however, that these papers find that labor input rises under all other monetary policy rules 
investigated.  For example, monetary rules based on inflation targeting, Taylor rules, and Clarida, Gali and Gertler￿s 
estimate of the Volker-Greenspan rule all imply that labor input rises in response to a positive technology shock, 
even in the face of sticky prices.  30
models. The first-difference specifications in Figure 1B and Figure 2B, as well as the VECM 
labor share specification in Figure A1, show that real wages jump immediately and follow the 
path of productivity, which is more consistent with the habit formation-adjustment cost model.  
On the other hand, the impulse response functions based on the VECM with the estimated 
cointegrating vector in Figure 2A show a slower response of real wages, favoring the sticky price 
model and Leontief model.  
The responses of the other variables are qualitatively similar across the models and the 
data.
12  Figure 6 of King and Wolman (1996) shows the responses of a variety of variables to a 
positive technology shock.  Most of the other variables￿ responses from the model accord well 
with our impulse responses shown above.  For example, output, consumption, and investment 
rise gradually in response to a positive technology shock. 
In sum, both a sticky price model and modified DGE models have similar implications 
for the responses of labor input, output, consumption, and investment to a technology shock.  
They differ in their implications for real wages.  The sticky price model and Leontief model 
predict a gradual response of wages, whereas the habit formation-adjustment cost model predicts 
that wages jump immediately.  The data do not give robust results on the latter response. 
 
V. Non-Technology  Shocks 
In the last section, we showed that a DGE model can be modified to replicate the 
negative effect of technology shocks on labor input.  This modification does not, however, 
resuscitate technology shocks as a source of business cycles. 
                                                           
12 The only exception is the immediate jump in investment in the Leontief model.  Adding investment adjustment 
costs to the model would bring the response of investment closer to the data.  31
Gal￿ argues that it is the shock to the labor equation that produces results that look like 
business cycles.  He shows that this shock, which he calls a ￿demand shock,￿ leads to a rise in 
output and labor, as well as a temporary rise in productivity, which is consistent with the stylized 
facts of business cycles.  Most of the business cycle movements in output and labor over the 
post-war are attributable to the demand shock rather than the technology shock. 
Since this shock is potentially ￿the business cycle shock,￿ we conclude this paper with a 
brief analysis of its properties.  Gal￿ identifies the demand shock in a bivariate model as the 
shock to the labor equation that is uncorrelated with the technology shock.  As a start, we use the 
labor shock estimated from the bivariate model in equation (5), testing whether this shock is 
correlated with the war, oil and monetary indicator variables.   
Recall that none of these variables was correlated with the technology shock.  The results 
are very different in the case of the labor shock, as shown in Table 4.  One can overwhelmingly 
reject the hypothesis that the Hoover-Perez oil dates and the Ramey-Shapiro war dates are not 
correlated with the shocks.  On the other hand, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the Romer 
monetary dates do not have any explanatory power. 
The oil dates and war dates variables explain a surprisingly large fraction of the labor 
equation shock.  When both dates are included, the R-squared of the regression is 0.19.  Thus, 
almost 20 percent of the variation in what appears to be a key business cycle shock is explained 
by political events that affect oil prices and defense spending.   
Finally, we investigate the effect of the labor shock in our five variable baseline VECM.   
For comparability with the bivariate model, we impose a Choleski decomposition so that hours 
are ordered before the three error correction terms. That is, in system (9) we impose the 
restrictions that C
2j(0) = 0 for j = 3, 4, 5 in order to identify ε
m as the labor equation shock.   32
Figure 6 shows the impulse response to a labor equation shock.  The responses of 
productivity, output and hours are very similar to those from Gal￿￿s work.  In particular, 
productivity rises temporarily for less than a year, and output and hours rise with a hump-shaped 
pattern.  The new variables added in our system are real wages, consumption, and investment.  
Investment and consumption rise, along with output and hours. Real wages fall, however, in 
response to the labor shock.  The labor shock appears to have only temporary effects, since all 
variables return to close to pre-shock levels within a year or two. 
What kind of shock would lead to this pattern of responses?  The patterns in the 
responses implicate one particular type of shock: a shock to the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure.  The rise in output, hours, consumption and investment in the 
face of declining wages is consistent with a shock that decreases the marginal utility of leisure.  
The labor supply curve shifts out, real wages fall, and firms invest more.  The temporary blip in 
productivity could be accounted for by a rise in effort or capital utilization.     
This interpretation is consistent with the conclusions of Shapiro and Watson (1988).   
Using somewhat different identifying assumptions they find that permanent shocks to labor 
supply are a major source of business cycles, accounting for 40 percent of the 8 quarter ahead 
variability in output.  They do not include real wages in their model.   
In his discussion of Shapiro and Watson, Hall (1988) expressed extreme skepticism about 
this conclusion.  Ironically, nine years later Hall (1997) uncovered a very similar result.  He 
decomposed the driving forces of business cycles based on a distinction between atemporal and 
intertemporal effects of shocks.  These results led him to conclude: ￿the prime driving force in 
fluctuations turns out to be shifts in the marginal rate of substitution between goods and work.￿  
Our findings lend further support to this conclusion.  33
VI. Conclusions 
When we initially set out on this project, we were somewhat skeptical that the shocks 
identified using long-run restrictions could plausibly be interpreted as technology shocks.  We 
were surprised to find that further study of the data supported that interpretation.  Indeed, what 
appears to have all of the right properties for a technology shock leads to very un-business cycle 
like characteristics.  Hours move in the opposite direction of output, productivity, consumption 
and investment. 
Faced with these strong facts, we then investigated whether other modeling devices 
besides sticky prices could produce these effects.  We found that the combination of habit 
persistence and adjustment costs on investment closely replicate the responses found in the data.  
Changing the production function to Leontief also led to predictions closer to those of the data. 
Finally, we studied the characteristics of the other key shock in the system, the one that 
produces positive comovements between output, productivity and hours.  We found that this 
shock also raises consumption and investment, but not real wages.  Almost 20 percent of the 
variation in this shock can be explained by simple dummy variables capturing oil events and 
military events.  34
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Table 1: Long-Restrictions Used in the Literature 
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Table 2:  Cointegration Tests 
(tests include constant and trend) 
 
System  P-value for hypothesis tests 
(optimal # of lags included) 
Cointegrating vector 
(estimated via DOLS) 
 
1.  x - w 
 
H0: x ￿ w has a unit root 




2.  x and w 
 
 
H0: No cointegration    




     (0.0090) 
 
3.  n, w, and c 
 
 
H0: No cointegration     
p = 0.003    (7 lags) 
 
 
(1, 1.04581, -1.03093) 
    (0.062)     (0.067) 
 
4.  x, n, w, c and i 
 
Johansen test:  r = # of 
cointegrating vectors 
 
H0:  r = 0,   p = 0.003 
 
H0:  r ≤ 1,   p = 0.037 
 






x = labor productivity 
w = real product wages 
n  = hours per capita 
c  = consumption expenditures per capita 
i  = gross investment expenditures per capita 39
 
Table 3: Exogeneity Tests 
Dependent Variable:  Technology Shocks from Bivariate Model 
 


















0.026 0.006 0.041 
 
The F-test is based on a regression of the identified technology shock on a constant and current 
and four quarterly lags of the variable in question.  (Lagged values of the technology shock are 
not included because the technology shock is by construction serially uncorrelated.)  The F-test 
corresponds to the test that all of the coefficients on the dummy variable in question are jointly 
equal to zero.  40
 
Table 4: Exogeneity Tests 
Dependent Variable:  Labor Shocks 
 






Oil and War Dates
 













0.029 0.146 0.057 0.193 
 
The F-test is based on a regression of the identified labor shock on a constant and current and 
four quarterly lags of the variable in question.  (Lagged values of the labor shock are not 
included because the labor shock is by construction serially uncorrelated.)  The F-test 
corresponds to the test that all of the coefficients on the dummy variable in question are jointly 
equal to zero.  41
Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Shock Effects Across Identification Schemes 
(90 percent confidence bands) 
 













































Figure 2A: Impulse Response to a Technology Shock 
5-Variable Baseline Vector-Error Correction Model 









































Figure 2B: Impulse Response to a Technology Shock 
5 Variable VECM with Labor Share 



































Figure 2C: Impulse Response to a Technology Shock 
5 Variable Model, First-Difference Model 

































Figure 3: Theoretical Effect of a Positive Technology Shock 










































Figure 5: Theoretical Effect of a Positive Technology Shock 



























































Figure 6: Impulse Response to a Labor Shock: 5 Variable VECM 
(90 percent confidence bands) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 